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Despite infection control measures, breakthrough
transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
occurred for many hospital workers in Hong Kong. We con-
ducted a case-control study of 72 hospital workers with
SARS and 144 matched controls. Inconsistent use of gog-
gles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated with a high-
er risk for SARS infection (unadjusted odds ratio 2.42 to
20.54, p < 0.05). The likelihood of SARS infection was
strongly associated with the amount of personal protection
equipment perceived to be inadequate, having <2 hours of
infection control training, and not understanding infection
control procedures. No significant differences existed
between the case and control groups in the proportion of
workers who performed high-risk procedures, reported
minor protection equipment problems, or had social contact
with SARS-infected persons. Perceived inadequacy of per-
sonal protection equipment supply, infection control training
<2 hours, and inconsistent use of personal protection
equipment when in contact with SARS patients were signif-
icant independent risk factors for SARS infection. 
T
he first large-scale outbreak of severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome (SARS) occurred on or near March 12,
2003 in the Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong (1). In
this worldwide epidemic, hospital workers were one of the
affected groups; as of May 31, 2003, a total of 384 (22.1%)
of 1,739 suspected or confirmed cases reported in Hong
Kong were hospital workers (2). In the initial phase of the
epidemic, hospital workers did not take special protective
measures. Thus, hospital workers accounted for 43.6% (68
of 156 cases) of those admitted to the Prince of Wales
Hospital from March 11 to 25, 2003 (3). By May 25, 2003,
a total of 453 confirmed SARS cases had been admitted to
hospitals in the New Territories East cluster of the Hospital
Authority in Hong Kong, which serves 1.3 million people
and to which the Prince of Wales Hospital belongs. From
March 28, 2003, to May 29, 2003, a total of 77 cases of
SARS infection among hospital workers had been report-
ed by the 5 hospitals in the cluster. 
A recent study concluded that the use of protective
masks is an effective countermeasure against SARS (4).
Nevertheless, even after these measures were implement-
ed, there were approximately 300 more hospital workers in
whom the disease developed. Limitations of that study
were the small number of cases and potential confounding
by the possible differences in the intensity of care given to
the SARS patients between the case and control groups. 
Breakthrough transmission continues despite imple-
menting strict infection control measures. We investigated
the factors associated with breakthrough transmission of




A 1:2 matched case-control design was used. All par-
ticipants were working in wards with SARS inpatients,
some of which also included non-SARS patients. The case
group included all infected hospital workers in the five
hospitals of the New Territories East cluster of the
Hospital Authority in Hong Kong who were registered as
SARS cases by the Department of Health’s eSARS reg-
istry and were hospitalized during March 28 through May
25, 2003. 
The SARS case definition criteria used by Hong Kong
Hospital Authority is as follows: radiographic evidence of
infiltrates consistent with pneumonia, and current fever
>38°C or a history of such at any time in the preceding
2 days, and at least two of the following: history of chills
in the past 2 days, new or increased cough or breathing
difficulty, general malaise or myalgia, typical signs of
consolidation, or known exposure. These criteria are
equivalent with the World Health Organization’s case def-
inition for probable SARS. Suspected SARS cases are
those that do not completely fulfill the above definition
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basis of clinical judgment. If no known history of expo-
sure exists, patients are considered for exclusion if an
alternative diagnosis can fully explain the clinical symp-
toms. Laboratory confirmation of SARS infection was
also conducted by one or more of the following assays:
reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR); culture from throat wash, urine, stool and nasal
swab specimens taken at days 1, 3, and 5; or paired sero-
logic assay from clotted blood taken at day 1 and 21.
Of 77 probable and suspected SARS cases, 72 (93.5%)
participated in the study. As all staff was required to use
protective masks from March 12, 2003, these hospital
workers were presumed to have contracted the virus as a
result of breakthrough transmission. An infection control
nurse explained the purpose and logistics of the study to the
study participants, obtained their verbal consent for partic-
ipation, presented them with a structured questionnaire, and
collected the completed questionnaire. SARS case-patients
were asked to nominate as controls two colleagues who had
been working in the same job position, in the same ward,
and in proximity with the case-patient before he became ill.
Medical and nursing staff (48 of 72 cases) self-adminis-
tered the questionnaires while other staff (e.g., healthcare
assistants and ward assistants) were interviewed by an
infection control nurse. Out of the 72 cases, 57 nominated
114 controls who completed the questionnaire (114/144 =
79.2%); 15 cases did not nominate a control and hence 30
controls were randomly selected from the duty roster of the
day before the case felt unwell, matching for job position
(30/144 = 20.8%). Questionnaires were collected from 57
(79.2%) nominated controls. Nominated controls who did
not return the questionnaire were replaced by controls ran-
domly selected from the duty roster of the day before the
case felt unwell, matching for job position (15/72 = 20.8%).
Of the 144 controls completing the questionnaire, one was
invalidated because she later became a suspected case.
Controls showed neither influenzalike symptoms nor
SARS-related symptoms during the study and had not been
identified as a suspected SARS case as of August 15, 2003.
No blood test was conducted to determine whether these
persons were asymptomatic SARS cases. Another study
that tested 674 healthcare workers who were working in the
same hospital cluster found no asymptomatic or subclinical
SARS. It can thereby be assumed that the control group had
not contracted the virus (5).
Measurements
Questions were asked about the hospital worker’s job
position, whether the healthcare worker had been second-
ed from another unit, whether he/she had made physical
contact with any SARS patients and if so, whether vari-
ous high-risk procedures were performed to the SARS
patient (including intubation, suction, cardiopulmonary
resuscitation). 
Personal protection equipment use (N95 mask, surgical
mask, gloves, goggles, gown, and cap) was examined
under three different settings: when having direct contact
with SARS patients, when having contact with “patients in
general” (includes both SARS and non-SARS patients),
and when there was “no patient contact.” Information
about the frequency of using different types of personal
protection equipment (never, occasionally, most of the
time, or all of the time) was asked for each of these three
settings. A respondent was considered to be exposed to a
particular risk if he or she had “never” or “occasionally”
been using personal protection equipment rather than
“most or all of the time.” Those who had not been in con-
tact with any SARS patients or patients in general were
considered as not having been exposed to the particular
risk. Respondents were asked whether they perceived the
supply of such personal protection equipment items to be
adequate or not (yes/no). Questions regarding the frequen-
cy of hand washing after making contact with SARS
patients, patients in general and when there was no patient
contact (never, occasionally, most of the time, all of the
time) were also asked. In the analysis, frequency of using
personal protection equipment and frequency of hand
hygiene practice were coded into 2 categories: used incon-
sistently (i.e., “never or occasionally used”) or used con-
sistently (“used most or all of the time”).
Study participants were also asked to assess whether
the masks fit them (yes/no), whether their goggles were
fogged (yes/no), and the frequency of touching protective
masks (never, occasionally, most of the time, or always),
and whether they had any problems complying with infec-
tion control procedures (yes/no). Respondents were asked
whether they had ever made social contact with others who
were later found to be SARS case-patients before SARS-
related symptoms manifested (yes/no/not sure), within the
14-day period before the case’s onset of symptoms. The
questionnaire also asked about the respondent’s exposure
to infection control training (length of SARS infection
control training) and whether they understood the infection
control measures (yes/no). A trained research assistant
contacted the respondents by telephone to follow up on
any incomplete or unclear answers.
Statistical Methods
Unadjusted matched odds ratios calculated from condi-
tional logistic regression methods (6) are summarized in
Tables 1 to 4. Amultivariate conditional logistic regression
was fitted using a forward-stepwise procedure with all
variables that were marginally significant (p < 0.10) in the
unadjusted analyses as candidates for selection. Matched
odds ratios and their exact 95% confidence intervals were
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Results
Background Characteristics of Respondents
The 72 SARS-infected healthcare workers worked in
five hospitals (distribution: 50% Alice Ho Miu Ling
Nethersole Hospital, 40.3% from Prince of Wales Hospital,
2.8% from North District Hospital, 4.2% from Shatin
Hospital, and 2.8% from Taipo Hospital). The study sam-
ple was composed of nurses 59.7% (n = 43), healthcare
assistants 23.6% (n = 17), medical officers 9.7% (n = 8),
clerical staff (2.8%, n = 2), and workmen (4.2%, n = 3). 
Use of Masks and Other Types 
of Protection Equipment
Almost 100% of the study respondents used either an
N95 mask or surgical mask in all 3 settings (Table 1). The
differences of the use of the N95 mask (most of those not
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Table 1. Percentage of healthcare workers exposed to the risk of inconsistent use of different types of personal protection equipment 
in 3 clinical settings with SARS patients
a 
Type of personal protection equipment 
Controls  
(n = 143)  % 
Case-patients 
(n = 72)  % 
Matched OR  
(exact 95% CI)  p value (exact) 
N95 or Surgical mask
b             
Direct contact with SARS patient  0  0  1  1.4  2.00 (0.05 to ∞)  0.6667 
Direct contact with patients in general
 c  1  0.7  2  2.8  4.00 (0.21to 235.99)  0.5185 
No patient contact
d  3  2.2  4  5.7  2.43 (0.41 to 16.77)  0.4198 
N95
b             
Direct contact with SARS patients  6  4.2  7  9.7  2.86 (0.70 to 13.71)  0.1683 
Direct contact with patients in general
c  5  3.6  3  4.2  1.28 (0.16 to 10.47)  1.0000 
No patient contact
d  14  10.2  12  17.1  1.83 (0.72 to 4.71)  0.2315 
Goggles
b             
Direct contact with SARS patients  12  8.4  23  31.9  6.41 (2.49 to 19.49)  <0.0001 
Direct contact with patients in general
e  7  5.1  16  22.2  6.93 (2.19 to 28.85)  0.0003 
No patient contact
f  19  13.9  21  30.0  3.50 (1.42 to 9.47)  0.0046 
Gown
b             
Direct contact with SARS patients  6  4.2  15  20.8  8.85 (2.46 to 48.28)  0.0002 
Direct contact with patients in general
c  2  1.4  12  16.7  11.54 (2.56 to 106.36)  0.0002 
No patient contact
f  16  11.7  19  27.1  3.42 (1.38 to 9.30)  0.0061 
Gloves
b             
Direct contact with SARS patients  2  1.4  11  15.3  20.54 (2.96 to 887.72)  0.0002 
Direct contact with patients in general
c  5  3.6  7  9.7  3.53 (0.77 to 21.85)  0.1211 
No patient contact
f  20  14.6  19  27.1  2.42 (1.05 to 5.81)  0.0374 
Cap
b             
Direct contact with SARS patients  8  5.6  17  23.6  7.30 (2.33 to 30.21)  0.0001 
Direct contact with patients in general
c  5  3.6  15  20.8  12.81 (2.92 to 116.75)  0.0001 
No patient contact”
f  16  11.7  22  31.4  4.05 (1.68 to 10.76)  0.0009 
No. of equipment inconsistently used with 
direct contact with SARS patients
g 
           
0  129  90.2  45  62.5  1.00   
1–2  7  4.9  13  18.1  5.35 (1.79 to 18.53)  0.0015 
>3  7  4.9  14  19.4  7.84 (2.30 to 34.83)  0.0003 
No. of equipment inconsistently used with 
direct contact with patients in general
e, g 
           
0  127  92.0  52  72.2  1.00   
1–2  6  4.3  8  11.1  4.85 (1.01 to 31.86)  0.0479 
>3  5  3.6  12  16.7  10.83 (2.29 to 102.60)  0.0007 
No. of equipment inconsistently used when 
there was no patient contact
 g, h 
           
0  113  82.5  46  65.7  1.00   
1–2  6  4.4  4  5.7  1.56 (0.28 to 7.97)  0.7721 
>3  18  13.1  20  28.6  3.40 (1.37 to 9.23)  0.0061 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; CI, confidence interval; OR, odds ratio.  
bThose having no contact with patients were considered to be unexposed to the tabulated risk factor. 
cInformation on 4 controls missing. 
dInformation on 4 controls and 2 case-patients missing. 
eInformation on 5 controls missing. 
fInformation on 6 controls and 1 case-patients missing. 
gInformation on 6 controls and 2 case-patients missing. 
hIncluding N95, goggles, gown, gloves and cap. wearing a N95 mask were wearing a surgical mask) were
not statistically significant between cases and controls in
any of the three settings (p > 0.05, Table 1). 
When hospital workers were in direct contact with
SARS patients, the case group was more likely to inconsis-
tently use goggles (odds ratio [OR] = 6.41, p < 0.0001),
gowns (OR = 8.85, p = 0.0002), gloves (OR = 20.54, p =
0.0002), and caps (OR = 7.30, p = 0.0001) than the control
group. When in direct contact with patients in general,
cases were more likely to inconsistently use goggle (OR =
6.93, p = 0.0003), gowns (OR = 11.54, p = 0.0002), and
caps (OR = 12.81, p = 0.0001). When there was “no patient
contact,” cases had more than a twofold likelihood of
inconsistently using goggles (p = 0.0046), gowns (p =
0.0061), gloves (p = 0.0374), or cap (p = 0.0009), com-
pared to their matched controls. Having three or more per-
sonal protection equipment inconsistently used (including
masks) was also a significant predictor of SARS infection
for hospital workers in direct contact with SARS patients
(OR = 7.84, p = 0.003); for those with direct contact with
patients in general (OR = 10.83, p = 0.0007); and for those
with no patient contact (OR = 3.4, p = 0.006) (Table1).
More than 97% of both the cases and control group
consistently reported to practice good hand hygiene after
contacting SARS patients or “patients in general” there-
fore differences between the two groups were not statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.22, and p = 1.00, respectively,
Table 2). There was, however, a statistically significant
difference in the proportion of cases (14.3%) and controls
(2.1%) of hospital workers who reported inconsistent hand
hygiene when there was “no patients contact” (OR = 6.38,
95% CI = 1.64, 36.2, p = 0.0044). 
Perceived Inadequacy of Personal 
Protection Equipment Supply
A much higher percentage of SARS cases compared to
controls reported a perceived inadequate supply of each of
the 6 types of personal protection equipment (OR = 28.0,
p < 0.0001 for surgical masks; OR = 5.19, p = 0.0004 for
N95 masks; OR = 8.44, p < 0.0001 for gowns; OR = 29.3,
p < 0.0001 for gloves; OR = 19.8, p < 0.0001 for goggles;
OR = 52.4, p < 0.0001 for cap) (Table 3). Most notably,
44.4% of the cases reported that there was an inadequate
supply of at least one item of the personal protection
equipment, as compared to 14.0% of the controls (OR =
6.78, p < 0.0011); among SARS cases, 26% reported three
or more personal protection equipment items as being in
inadequate supply, compared to 1.4% of the controls (OR
= 52.2, p < 0.0001). 
SARS-Related Infection Control Training
The unadjusted results indicated that 50% of SARS
cases did not receive any SARS infection control training
(versus 28% of the controls) (Table 4). Those who under-
went >2 hours of training (4.2% of cases and 25.2% of
controls) were far less likely to have been infected with
SARS (OR = 0.03, p < 0.0001). Of the SARS cases, 23.9%
indicated that they did not understand the infection control
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Table 2. Percentage with inconsistent hand hygiene
a 
Controls (n = 143)  Case-patients (n = 72) 
Category  n  %  n  %  Matched OR (exact 95% CI)  p value (exact) 
After direct contact with SARS patients  0  0  2  2.8  4.83 (0.38 to ∞)  0.2222 
After direct contact with “patients in general”
b  2  1.4  1  1.4  1.00 (0.02 to 19.21)  1.0000 
When there was “no patient contact”
c  3  2.1  10  14.3  6.38 (1.64 to 36.17)  0.0044 
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bInformation on 3 controls missing. 
cInformation on 1 control and 2 case-patients missing. 
Table 3. Percentages with perceived inadequacy of personal protection equipment supply and breakthrough SARS infection among 
hospital workers
a 
Controls (n = 143)  Case-patients (n = 72) 
Type of personal protection equipment  n  %  n  %  Matched OR (exact 95% CI)  p value (exact) 
Surgical mask  1  0.7  14  19.4  28.00 (4.26 to ∞)  <0.0001 
N95 mask  13  9.1  20  27.8  5.19 (1.95 to 16.13)  0.0004 
Gown  7  4.9  19  26.4  8.44 (2.77 to 34.37)  <0.0001 
Gloves  2  1.4  12  16.7  29.34 (4.79 to ∞)  <0.0001 
Goggles  5  3.5  22  30.6  19.81 (4.83 to 174.55)  <0.0001 
Cap  4  2.8  21  29.2  52.41 (9.08 to ∞)  <0.0001 
Any one of above as inadequate
b  20  14.0  32  44.4  6.78 (2.86 to 18.51)  <0.0001 
No. of items identified to be inadequate
b             
0  123  86.0  40  55.6  1.00   
1–2  18  12.6  13  18.1  3.25 (1.17 to 9.80)  0.0209 
3  2  1.4  19  26.4  52.24 (7.70 to 2280.07)  <0.0001 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. 
bIncluding N95 mask, goggle, gown, gloves and cap. measures, compared with 8.5% of the controls (OR = 3.14,
p = 0.0065). Duration of SARS training (<2 hrs versus >2
hours) was significantly associated with reported under-
standing of the infection control measures (OR = 7.29, p =
0.001). There was also a marginal statistically significant
difference (OR = 0.27, p = 0.057) in the proportion who
reported having received updated SARS information
between case-patients (88.9%) and controls (96.5%).
Patient Care and Infection Control Measures
A higher but statistically nonsignificant percentage of
the control group (73.4%) reported having direct contact
with SARS patients as compared to the case group
(62.5%). Three (4.2%) of 72 case-patients and 7 (4.9%) of
143 controls reported that they had no direct contact with
patients in general (p > 0.05). Having performed high-risk
procedures on SARS patients and being seconded from
another unit were not significantly associated with risk of
SARS infection (Table 4).
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Table 4. Percentage distributions of variables related to training, patient care, social contact and mask compliance
a 
Controls (n = 143)  Case-patients (n = 72) 
Characteristic  n  %  N  %  Matched OR (exact 95% CI)  p value (exact) 
Length of SARS infection control training             
None  40  28.0  36  50.0  1.00   
<2hrs  67  46.9  33  45.8  0.47 (0.18 to 1.14)  0.1028 
>2hrs  36  25.2  3  4.2  0.03 (0.001 to 0.20)  <0.0001 
Understood infection control measures
b             
Yes  130  91.5  54  76.1  1.00   
No  12  8.5  17  23.9  3.14 (1.35 to 7.73)  0.0065 
Acquired updated information             
No  5  3.5  8  11.1  1.00   
Yes  136  96.5  64  88.9  0.27 (0.06 to 1.04)  0.0574 
High risk procedures with SARS patients
c             
No  115  86.5  60  83.3  1.00   
Yes  18  13.5  12  16.7  1.22 (0.45 to 3.14)  0.8061 
Direct contact with SARS patients             
No/Not sure  38  26.6  27  37.5  1.00   
Yes  105  73.4  45  62.5  0.57 (0.28 to 1.14)  0.1197 
Direct contact with patients in general             
No/Not sure  7  4.9  3  4.2  1.68  1.000 
Yes  136  95.1  69  95.8  (0.07 to 117.74)   
Seconded from another unit             
No  77  53.8  46  63.9  1.00   
Yes  66  46.2  26  36.1  0.60 (0.29 to 1.21)  0.1671 
Social contact with SARS patients             
No/Not sure  95  66.4  55  76.4  1.00   
Yes  48  33.6  17  23.6  0.59 (0.28 to 1.19)  0.1592 
Frequency of touching the N95
d             
Never/occasional  108  76.6  46  70.8  1.00   
Most of the time/Always  33  23.4  19  29.2  1.32 (0.63 to 2.74)  0.5205 
General problems with mask
e             
No  72  51.4  41  59.4  1.00   
Yes  68  48.6  28  49.6  0.66 (0.34 to 1.27)  0.2407 
Problems with mask fit
f             
No  73  51.0  36  52.1  1.00   
Yes  70  49.0  33  47.8  1.00 (0.51 to 1.95)  1.0000 
Problems with fogging of goggles
g             
No  67  47.2  40  60.1  1.00   
Yes  75  52.8  26  39.9  0.61 (0.31 to 1.17)  0.1520 
Overall problems in general compliance
h             
No  69  50.0  41  58.6  1.00   
Yes  69  50.0  29  41.4  0.58 (0.25 to 1.33)  0.2264 
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
 
bInformation on 1 control and 1 case-patient missing. 
cInformation on 10 controls with direct contact with SARS patients missing. 
dExcluded 2 controls and 6 case-patients who did not use N95 mask; information on 1 case-patient missing. 
eExcluded 1 case who did not use mask; information on 3 controls and 2 case-patients missing. 
fExcluded 1 case who did not use mask; information on 2 case-patients missing. 
gExcluded 3 cases who did not use goggle; information on 1 control and 3 case-patients missing. 
hExcluded 1 case who did not use any equipment; information on 5 controls and 1 case-patient missing. There were no significant differences between the per-
centages of case-patients and controls who reported the
following problems: general compliance problems, fre-
quency of touching or adjusting the N95 mask, general
problems with mask, problems with mask fit, and prob-
lems with fogging of goggles (Table 4).
Social Contact with SARS Cases
Approximately 23.6% of the SARS case-patients and
33.6% of the matched controls reported ever having social
contact with someone who was later diagnosed with SARS
before the onset of symptoms of the relevant case-patients
(p = 0.1592) (Table 4). 
Problems Encountered
Seven problems in the unadjusted analysis (Table 5)
were significantly associated with risk for SARS infection.
An indicator variable was constructed by counting the
number of problems encountered by the study participants.
Almost all (98.6%) of the case group encountered at least
one problem (versus 79.9% in the control group). The risk
increases greatly with the number of problems encoun-
tered (OR = 44.2 for 3 or more problems, p < 0.0001)
(Table 5). Using a cut-off point of two or more problems to
predict SARS infection gives a sensitivity and specificity
of 0.681 and 0.691, respectively.
Multivariate Analysis
The results of the forward stepwise conditional logistic
regression model using the seven significant variables as
candidate variables indicate that the perceived inadequacy
of personal protection equipment supply (adjusted OR =
4.27, 95% CI 1.66 to 12.54, p = 0.0028), SARS infection
control training <2 hours or no training (adjusted OR =
13.6, 95% CI 1.24 to 27.50, p = 0.002), and inconsistent
use of more than one type of personal protection equip-
ment when having direct contact with SARS patients
(adjusted OR = 5.06, 95% CI 1.91 to 598.92, p = 0.02)
were significantly and independently associated with
SARS infection among hospital workers.
Discussion
Breakthrough transmission was likely responsible for
the SARS infection of these cases, as protective masks
(primarily N95) were used consistently by almost all of the
cases. All workers were required to wear protective masks
from March 12, 2003. Using protective masks alone is,
therefore, not sufficient to eliminate SARS transmission
among hospital workers. Cases were less likely to have
had direct contact with a SARS patient than controls, sug-
gesting that direct physical contact with SARS patients
was not necessary for breakthrough transmission to occur.
It also suggests that modes of transmission other than
droplets cannot be excluded. Consistent hand hygiene after
contact with patients was almost universal and was not a
significant factor predicting SARS transmission in our
study, although hand hygiene appeared to be a risk factor
in situations when there was no patient contact.
Data from all the three settings show that inconsistent
use of gown, cap, and goggles were all very strongly asso-
ciated with breakthrough transmissions. Personal protec-
tion equipment should be used consistently in all three set-
tings. The high degree of collinearity in the use of the
various types of personal protection equipment makes it
difficult to ascertain which type of personal protection
equipment is most important as a SARS countermeasure.
Nevertheless, policy makers should be made aware that
the supply of different types of personal protection equip-
ment had often been seen as inadequate, and it is one of
the very significant risk factors identified. The perception
of inadequate supply was not verified by this study. These
perceptions may reflect the actual situation or may be an
inaccurate impression of the hospital workers. Caution is
advised in interpreting these results. Nevertheless, at the
time of the study, the media had reported frequent com-
plaints about personal protection equipment supply short-
ages from hospital workers. The perception of inadequate
personal protection equipment is likely to be associated
with the personal protection equipment supply situation.
Given the large differences in our results (OR > 5.0,
p < 0.001), it is likely that personal protection equipment
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Table 5: Percentage distribution of the number of problems encountered by the hospital worker
a 
Controls  Case-patients  No. of problems 
encountered
b  n  %  Cumulative %  n  %  Cumulative % 
Matched OR 
(exact 95% CI) 
p value 
(exact) 
0  27  20.1  20.1  1  1.4  1.4  1.00   
1  65  48.5  68.6  21  30.4  31.8  8.47(1.37 to ∞)  0.0169 
2  24  17.9  86.5  17  24.6  56.4  17.78(2.67 to ∞)  0.0010 
>3
c.d  18  13.4  100.0  30  43.5  100.0  44.15(7.02 to ∞)  <0.0001 
aExcluded nine controls and thee cases that had at least one missing entry on one of the problems encountered. 
bThe seven problems are: 1) inconsistent use of at least 1 type of personal protection equipment when having contact with SARS patients, 2) with “patients in general,” 3) 
when there was “no patient contact,” 4) when SARS infection control training was less than 2 hours, 5) when the respondent reported not understanding SARS infection 
control procedures, 6) when at least one personal protection equipment was perceived to be in inadequate supply in the 3 settings, and 7) when hand hygiene was 
inconsistent when there was “no patient contact.” 
cPercentages of the number of problems encountered in the control group: 3 problems (6.7%), 4 problems (4.5%), 5 (1.5%), 6 (0.7%), and 7 (0%). 
dPercentages of the number of problems encountered in the case group: 3 problems (10.1%), 4 (8.7%), 5 (13.0%), 6 (8.7%), and 7 (2.9%). shortages were at least partially responsible for many of
the SARS infections. As inadequate knowledge of SARS
infection control (“did not understand procedures”) is also
a strong risk factor for breakthrough transmission, SARS
infection control training must not be overlooked. In-
depth, thorough training (>2 hrs) is required. 
Soon after the initial SARS outbreak, it was mandatory
for all hospital workers to attend at least one 1-hour struc-
tured training session delivered by the infection control
team, and the records of these sessions were collected and
submitted to the Hospital Authority. These training ses-
sions were conducted twice per day for the initial week
from the middle of March and daily until the end of June.
The content of these training sessions included basic
knowledge of SARS and its clinical presentation, route of
transmission, types and proper use of different personal
protective equipment for different risk levels, the proce-
dures for handling high risk specimens, environmental dis-
infection protocols, and commonly observed problems.
The content of the training was regularly revised with
updated information. Regular updates and attendance of
the training sessions were strongly recommended. The unit
supervisors were given more intensive training to train
their staff. The findings of this study underscore the impor-
tance of in-depth training in SARS prevention among hos-
pital workers.
The findings eliminate a number of speculated risk fac-
tors which include the following: performing particular
high-risk procedures on SARS patients, having social con-
tacts with people who were later found to have SARS
cases, and experiencing various minor problems in using
the mask. Performing high-risk procedures was not a sig-
nificant factor, hence, it is speculated that this is due to a
high degree of awareness and caution taken when perform-
ing these procedures with SARS patients.
It is found that those who encountered any of the seven
identified problems had a greatly increased likelihood of
contracting SARS. The number of problems encountered
is a strong predictor of SARS infection. It is recommend-
ed that, after each day’s work, health workers complete a
checklist to be reviewed by management. No hospital staff
should be exposed to SARS before receiving adequate
training or before they have obtained a thorough under-
standing of the infection control procedures. The results of
the multivariate analysis show that infection control train-
ing, personal protection equipment use, and perceived sup-
ply were independently associated with SARS infection
risk among hospital workers. 
This study has a number of limitations. As a case-
control study, it is subject to recall bias. However, the
recall period was usually within 1 week as all the case-
patients were interviewed while they were hospitalized.
Hand hygiene data were self-reported and not audited.
Nevertheless, since respondents were required to report the
frequency of hand washing from a categorical response
format rather than an open ended question, the responses
should be reasonably reliable. Another possible bias may
be the case group’s attributing their infection to external
factors (e.g., inadequate supplies) and the control group’s
doing the opposite. Given that the odds ratios obtained
were strongly significant and consistent with one another,
it is unlikely that this form of bias could account for all of
the observed differences. The study, however, has a rela-
tively large sample size, a high response rate, and has con-
trolled for the exposure to other background confounding
factors.
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